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Abstract 
 
The current financial problems of some Euro-area Member States have been tackled by 
ad hoc financial institutions, formed outside of the EU as international institutions and 
aimed at granting financial assistance on the basis of strict conditionality measures, which 
seriously affect human rights (particularly social and economic rights). 
The paper focuses on the impact of the actions of the European Stability Mechanism 
and analyses whether this institution (or the European institutions and the Member States 
involved in it) should bear the responsibility for such violations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent times, the Eurozone Member States (MS) have devised complex international 
financial mechanisms, tightly linked to themselves and European Union (EU) institutions 
but formally set outside the EU. These mechanisms were necessary because of the EU’s 
perceived inability to help MS, and the Eurozone MS in particular, to get out of the crisis. 
Indeed, in the same way as the no bail out clauseI prevents the Union from assuming the 
commitments of central Governments, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 
in turn prevents ‘national central banks’ from financing public debt.II It is in this context 
that extra-EU mechanisms have been created to support Eurozone MS by avoiding the 
economic crisis’s effects in those MS experiencing financial difficulties and combating 
these effects in the Euro-area as a whole.  
However, as legal scholars have already explained, these financial institutions 
undermine the stability and legitimacy of the EU project (Dawson and de Witte 2013; see 
also Joerges 2014: 1109-1013 on the implications of the new modes of European economic 
governance for the EU’s state). Moreover, such mechanisms jeopardize the protection of 
human rights (particularly social and economic rights) for citizens and inhabitants of MS in 
receipt of aid, as a consequence of conditionality measures attached to financial assistance.  
After briefly analyzing how the financial crisis has been managed, this article will focus 
on human rights concerns that stem from these strict conditionality measures, and on the 
responsibility for possible human rights violations, with particular regard to the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) framework. 
 
2. Managing the crisis 
 
2.1. Financial devices: the EFSM, the EFSF, the ESM 
In order to address the crisis of sovereign debt, three financial stability mechanisms 
have been created: the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the ESM. Such measures, aimed at granting 
assistance to avoid the risk of State failure as a consequence of market failure, are also 
known as “Rescue Funds”. 
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The EFSM was established by EU Regulation No. 407/2010,III on the basis of Article 
122(2) TFEU, to grant Union financial assistance to a MS affected by or seriously 
threatened with a severe economic or financial disturbance caused by exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control. According to Article 3(2) of this Regulation, such 
assistance is granted via a decision adopted by the European Council, which essentially 
dictates the payment methods and the economic conditions attached to the Union’s 
financial assistance. The EFSM, however, could only provide financial assistance of up to 
€60 billion, through a joint process between the EU and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF);IV and the total amount provided for the EFSM was, therefore, quite low in the 
context of the ongoing economic crisis.  
Thus, in order to increase the amount of financial assistance available, new steps were 
necessary; for this reason the Euro-area MS signed an agreement to establish the EFSF, a 
public limited liability company (société anonyme) incorporated in and governed by the laws 
of Luxembourg, with its registered office in Luxembourg-City.V The EFSF was funded by 
the Euro-area MS as shareholders, while its decisions were made by the EFSF’s governing 
bodies. This early mechanism granted financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
but was just a temporary measure.VI This temporary aspect notwithstanding its significant 
financial capacity (€440 billion),VII led the Euro-area MS to adopt the ESM as a 
replacement for the EFSF, and to assume the tasks fulfilled by it.VIII 
The ESM is, in contrast, a permanent financial mechanism with a lending capacity of 
up to €500 billion (“including the outstanding EFSF stability support”),IX established 
through an international agreement signed on 2 February 2012 between Euro-area MS, in 
accordance with the previous Decision No. 2011/199 of the European Council of 
December 2010.X The amendment of Article 136 TFEU was made on the basis of Article 
48 TFEU, which governs the simplified revision process.XI Such an amendment was 
necessary in order to create the ESM financial mechanism and avoid infringements of the 
TFEU, in particular the no bail out clause, enshrined in Article 125 TFEU (Napolitano 2012). 
The Preamble of the ESM Treaty states that the ESM, in connection with the “Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union” 
(TSCG), commonly known as the “Fiscal Compact”,XII fosters fiscal responsibility and 
solidarity within the economic and monetary union. Its aim is then more specifically 
mentioned in Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, which specifies that financial support will be 
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provided to the benefit of ESM Members experiencing or threatened by severe financing 
problems, if such support is indispensable to safeguard both the stability of the Eurozone 
as a whole and that of its MS. The ESM can grant assistance in three ways: it may decide to 
a) arrange for the purchase of an ESM Member’s bonds on the primary market; b) arrange 
for operations on the secondary market in relation to the bonds of an ESM Member; or c) 
grant financial assistance through loans to an ESM Member for the specific purpose of re-
capitalizing that Member’s financial institutions. 
Such assistance, as has already been provided to Cyprus, Spain and Greece,XIII is 
granted on the basis of a decision by the Board of Governors, composed of representatives 
of Governments.XIV The financial assistance facility agreement is then approved by the 
Board of Directors, the other ESM body, composed of Governors’ representatives.XV 
Thus, while adopted by ESM bodies, financial assistance decisions are in fact steered by the 
ESM’s shareholding States. Notwithstanding the fact that ESM bodies formally adopt 
decisions, it is worth noting the important role played by two EU institutions – namely the 
European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) – in the granting of 
financial assistance to a requesting Euro-area MS. Indeed, once the State involved has 
asked the President of the Board of Governors for financial assistance, the EC, together 
with the ECB and the IMF, has to evaluate the risk the State’s instability would bring to the 
stability of the Euro-area as a whole.XVI When such a risk is identified, and after the 
decision of the Board of Governors on the granting of financial assistance, the EC must 
negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), containing strict conditionality 
measures attached to the provision of financial assistance.XVII The EC then signs this 
documentXVIII and the Board of Directors approves the financial assistance facility 
agreement detailing the financial aspects of the stability support.XIX 
Thus, like Euro-area MS, which are represented in the ESM’s bodies discussed above, 
the EC and the ECB are also relevant actors in the process of granting assistance. 
 
2.2. The procedure to grant financial assistance and ESM compatibility with the no 
bail out clause: the role played by the conditionality measures 
Since the ESM, like its predecessor the EFSF, ensures financial assistance on the basis 
of decisions adopted by Euro-area MS representatives, and through a procedure that also 
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involves the EC and the ECB, there has been a question whether the ESM’s actions in fact 
constituted a violation of the no bail out clause. 
Specifically, the possibility of establishing such a permanent stability mechanism has 
been challenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Pringle case.XX In the 
judgment, the ECJ, after having affirmed the validity of Decision No 2011/199 (de Witte 
and Beukers 2013; De Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos 2014; Van Malleghem 2013),XXI 
addressed the question of whether Euro-area MS were allowed to enter into the ESM 
Treaty according to EU law. Such an issue, which concerns the validity of posterior 
agreements concluded by MS inter se, is not specifically addressed in Article 351 TFEU 
(Klabbers 2008: 205-211; de Witte 2000: 31-58). However, Member States’ ability to enter 
into such agreements is traditionally admitted when there is no exclusive competency of 
the EU in that area, and where the agreement complies with EU primary law. This 
assumption has been confirmed by the ECJ, which, in Pringle, stated that the ESM does not 
affect the exclusive competency of the EU,XXII and also affirmed that the ESM complies 
with EU law. In particular, the ESM Treaty does not infringe the no bail out clause, as the EU 
institutions involved are not acting by themselves within the ESM framework and the ESM 
grants financial assistance in the form of a credit line, without assuming the debts of the 
receiving Member State.XXIII Moreover, it is worth noting that the ECJ highlighted the 
relevance of the strict conditionality measures attached to the financial assistance in 
guaranteeing the consistency of commitments undertaken by the Euro-area MS with EU 
law. Indeed, according to the ECJ, 
 
“the conditionality prescribed […] does not constitute an instrument for the 
coordination of the economic policies of the Member States, but is intended to ensure 
that the activities of the ESM are compatible with, inter alia, Article 125 TFEU and the 
coordinating measures adopted by the Union” .XXIV 
 
Thus, the ECJ has interpreted these conditions as key factors for ESM compatibility 
with the no bail out clause and the coordinating measures adopted by the EU.XXV  
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3. ESM and the strict conditionality rule as a vulnus to human rights 
protection 
 
I argue that it is these conditionality measures, set out in the MoUs, and interpreted by 
the ECJ as important for the consistency of ESM’s financial assistance with the EU law, 
that are controversial. 
Indeed, such measures usually impose cutbacks in welfare expenditures, namely 
pension funds, social insurance schemes, healthcare, and education. In the name of 
macroeconomic adjustments, the MoUs have already prescribed, for instance, a reduction 
in pharmaceutical spending, a decrease in the minimum wage and suspension of collective 
bargaining agreements (Poulou 2014: 1147-1148; Karger 2014: 33-53). Such prescriptive 
conditions are usually extremely detailed and peremptory; for instance, the MoU signed by 
the Greek Government with the EFSF imposed a progressive reduction of a specific 
number of personnel in public entities, an increase of the retirement age by two years 
starting in January 2013, the re-capitalization process for the banking sector, and a program 
for controlling pharmaceutical spending.XXVI 
As a consequence, human rights protection is therefore seriously threatened, a concern 
shared by some legal scholars, who have highlighted that 
 
“[t]he strict conditionality contained in the MoU may very well and very directly 
impinge on the social and economic rights of the EU citizens” (Schwarz 2014: 398; see 
also Tomkin 2013: 187, and also Salomon 2015). 
 
The effects of economic adjustment programs on social and economic rights have also 
been highlighted by the UN General Assembly, in a series of Reports about the effects of 
foreign debt and other related financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.XXVII Specifically, these 
reports have given evidence for the impact of economic management on several aspects: 
work, social security, health, education, adequate housing, poverty and social exclusion, and 
other rights such as civil and political rights. The report of the Independent Expert 
concerning Greece,XXVIII in particular, has clarified that 
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“[t]he measures implemented as part of adjustment, in particular the job cuts, and cuts 
to wages and pensions, have had the overall effect of compromising the living 
standards of the population and the enjoyment of human rights. According to the 
National Ombudsman, ‘the drastic adjustments imposed on the Greek economy and 
society as a whole have had dramatic consequences on citizens, while vulnerable groups 
increase and multiply’ […]. In a similar vein, the National Human Rights Commission 
observed a ‘rapid deterioration in living standards coupled with the dismantling of the 
welfare State and the adoption of measures incompatible with social justice, which are 
undermining social cohesion and democracy’ […]”.XXIX 
 
According to the report, in Greece there have been specific examples of an exponential 
rise in unemploymentXXX and a substantial reduction in unemployment benefits, pensions 
and family benefits.XXXI In addition, the cuts in health care spending have led to the 
resurfacing of illnesses that had been eradicated in the country, such as malaria,XXXIIand an 
increase in HIV infections and mental health problems has been reported.XXXIII Lastly, the 
cuts on social expenditures have led to the closure of schools and the reduction in numbers 
of teachersXXXIV as well as an increase in homelessness.XXXV The rise of poverty has also 
caused numerous protests in the country, which has led the national authorities to adopt 
several security measures; this in turn has raised concerns with regard to the freedom of 
assembly and association.XXXVI 
In this way, therefore, human rights protection is seriously threatened, in particular 
those human rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (CFREU), in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its 
Protocols and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Specifically, conditionality measures could affect social rights such as: the right 
to education, enshrined in Article 14 of CFREU, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, 
and Article 14 CESCR; the right to social security and social assistance provided for in 
Article 34 of CFREU; the right to social security enshrined in Article 9 of CESCR; and the 
right to health enumerated in Article 35 CFREU and in Article 12 CESCR. Moreover, such 
conditionality could affect the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of CFREU and in 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR,XXXVII as can happen, for instance, when 
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adjustment programs impose a reduction in the value of bank deposits or cuts of salaries or 
pensions. 
Given the potential for infringements of the human rights provisions, the issue 
regarding the responsibility for human rights violations then arises. Particularly, it could be 
questioned whether the ESM itself, the EU institutions involved in the ESM, or the Euro-
area MS could bear any responsibility for the ESM’s decisions affecting the human rights 
of citizens in assisted States. A legal scholar has already addressed similar issues on a global 
level regarding the IMF and the World Bank (WB) (De Sena 2010).  
 
4. Strict conditionality and responsibility 
 
4.1. The legal nature of the ESM and its (lack of) responsibility for human rights 
violations 
In order to address the ESM’s potential responsibility and the possibility of filing suits 
against it before an international court, it is necessary to understand the legal nature of the 
ESM and whether it is bound by human rights law. 
The first question, namely that of the ESM’s legal nature, is not clearly answered by the 
wording of the ESM Treaty. Indeed, while Article 1 of the Treaty defines the ESM as an 
“international financial institution”, this is an expression notable for its ambiguities, as 
pointed out by Napolitano, who has highlighted that, although created by an international 
agreement, the ESM has a European dimension, which makes it quite close to a European 
agency (Napolitano 2012). According to Napolitano, this dimension is seen in several of its 
characteristics, such as the ESM Treaty’s link to EU primary law, its peculiar membership 
composed only of EU MS, the role played by the EC and the ECB, and the ESM’s 
complementarity with European monetary and economic policy. Other legal scholars, 
conversely, argue that the ESM in fact constitutes an international organization (Ruffert 
2011: 1783 and 1790; Schwarz 2014: 400). The ESM, indeed, has been established by an 
international treaty and has its own governance. 
With regard to the second question, namely whether the ESM is bound by human 
rights law, some legal scholars affirm that the ESM should respect EU principles in this 
area. In fact, the ESM Treaty itself requires the EC to act cohesively with EU law, and the 
MoUs must be 
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“fully consistent with the measures of economic policy coordination provided for in 
the TFEU, in particular with any act of European Union law, including any opinion, 
warning, recommendation or decision addressed to the ESM Member 
concerned”.XXXVIII 
 
However, this requirement to respect EU law is confined to a narrow sector, namely 
EU provisions on economic policy coordination and EU acts specifically addressing the 
ESM. 
Indeed, as von Bogdandy and Ioannidis affirmed, the ESM is an international 
instrument completely separate from the TEU and the TFEU systems (von Bogdandy and 
Ioannidis 2014: 94), which means that it is not bound by the EU fundamental rights 
enshrined in the CFREU. Thus, since the ESM is placed outside the EU and within its own 
Treaty, with no reference to the CFREU, consequently the validity of an ESM decision 
could not be challenged in light of that legal text. 
The ECJ in the Pringle case expressly excluded the possibility of taking the CFREU into 
consideration within the ESM framework. Specifically, the ECJ affirmed that the Euro-area 
MS were not prevented from signing the ESM Treaty in the light of EU fundamental 
rights, in particular the general principle of effective judicial protection, the right to an 
effective remedy and the general principle of legal certainty, enshrined in Article 47 of the 
CFREU.XXXIX Such concerns were raised because Article 37(2) of the ESM Treaty affirms 
that “the Board of Governors shall decide on any dispute arising between an ESM Member 
and the ESM, or between ESM Members, in connection with the interpretation and 
application of the ESM Treaty”.XL Only if “an ESM Member contests [that] decision […], 
the dispute shall be submitted to the Court of Justice”.XLI  
In light of these provisions, the question was raised as to whether the ESM Treaty was 
consistent with the CFREU. On this point, the ECJ recalled that, under Article 51(1) of the 
CFREU, the provisions of the CFREU apply to the MS when they are implementing 
Union law. The ECJ also affirmed that this situation does not occur when MS establish a 
stability mechanism such as the ESM,XLII which stands outside of the EU.  
The inapplicability of the CFREU to the ESM Treaty therefore impedes assigning 
direct responsibility to the ESM for human rights violations in light of it. 
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Such a responsibility cannot arise from the ECHR or the CESCR either, since the ESM 
is not part of those Agreements. Finding that the ESM bears responsibility based on jus 
cogens, then, is unrealistic, since, as De Sena already explained with regard to the IMF and 
the WB, it is unlikely that the ESM itself commits strong violations of human rights (De 
Sena 2010). 
Thus, it is difficult to identify the ESM’s direct responsibility for violations of human 
rights caused by conditionality measures; one may wonder, however, whether it is possible 
that the EU institutions and the ESM’s MS could be responsible for ESM actions that 
violate these rights.  
 
4.2. The ESM’s measures and the potential responsibility of EU institutions 
The issue of the responsibility of EU institutions involved in the ESM for acts adopted 
by the latter that affect human rights arises for two reasons: first, because of the EU 
institutions’ relevant role in granting financial assistance within the framework of the ESM, 
and second, because even in that framework such institutions should respect EU law in 
general, and human rights in particular. The Advocate General Kokott had clearly 
expressed this assumption with regard to the Pringle case, where she affirmed that 
 
“[t]he Commission remains, even when it acts within the framework of the ESM, an 
institution of the Union and as such is bound by the full extent of European Union 
law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights” .XLIII 
 
However, the potential responsibility of the EU institutions have subsequently been 
denied by the European General Court (GC), which is part of the ECJ, in the set of orders 
regarding Cyprus.XLIV There, the applicants filed several suits against the EC’s and ECB’s 
acts, assuming, in particular, the inconsistency of some of the conditions negotiated by the 
former and set in the MoU.  
These cases arose from the recapitalization of a number of banks established in Cyprus, 
which experienced financial difficulties during 2012. At that time, in order to recapitalize 
them, the Republic of Cyprus petitioned the President of the Eurogroup for financial 
assistance from the EFSF or the ESM. The Eurogroup approved the request on 27 June 
2012, indicating that either the EFSF or the ESM would provide the financial assistance 
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requested in the framework of a macro-economic adjustment program to be set out in the 
MoU. The Republic of Cyprus and the other Euro-area MS reached a political agreement 
on a draft MoU in March 2013. 
With a view to signing the final draft, Cyprus adopted two laws providing for the re-
capitalization of two banks, “Trapeza Kyprou Dimosia Etaira Ltd” (BoC) and “Cyprus 
Popular Bank Public Co Ltd” (Laïki). This re-capitalization happened at the expense of its 
uninsured depositors, shareholders and bondholders (in particular, some deposits were 
converted into shares or other financial instruments and some deposits were transferred by 
Laïki to BoC).XLV 
This macro-economic adjustment program, which entailed a reduction of bank 
deposits, was approved by the Eurogroup. After this approval, not in itself required by the 
ESM Treaty,XLVI the ESM Board of Governors mandated that the EC sign the MoU on 
behalf of the ESM. The MoU, which was signed on 26 April 2013, specifically favoured the 
restructuring plan adopted by Cyprus, particularly taking into consideration the measures 
related to the aforementioned banks.  
Since these measures resulted in a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits, 
though, suits were filed before the GC against the EC and the ECB on the basis of the 
property right enshrined in Article 17 of the CFREU and in Article 1 of the ECHR 
Protocol No. 1. 
The GC, however, pointed out that the MoU was in fact adopted by the ESM, not by 
the EU institutions, and the MoU merely approved the measures already adopted by the 
Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, the GC dismissed the actions as inadmissible in part and in 
part manifestly lacking any foundation in law. 
The GC thus denied that there was any worth in the behavior of EU institutions 
involved in the MoU negotiations or in the approval of conditionality rules adopted by the 
Republic of Cyprus, even after the lengthy negotiations at the EU level that were guided by 
a process that involved EU institutions and the Eurogroup. Moreover, the GC affirmed the 
non-applicability of the CFREU because the ESM is set outside the EU. However, 
pursuant to Article 13 TEU, the EU institutions “shall aim to promote [the EU’s] values, 
advance [the EU’s] objectives, serve [the EU’s] interests, those of [the EU] citizens and 
those of the Member States”; it is worth noting that this Article does not confine the EU 
institutions’ aims strictly within the EU framework. Thus, as the Advocate General Kokott 
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affirmed, the EU institutions should be considered bound by the full extent of EU law, 
including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, when acting within the ESM’s framework.  
 
4.3. The ESM’s measures and the potential responsibility of Member States 
In addition to EU institutions, the question arises as to whether the ESM’s 
shareholders – namely the Euro-area MS – could be responsible for acts that the ESM 
adopted. 
In this perspective, the responsibility of Euro-area MS could be derived from the 
ICESCR (to which all the ESM’s MS are parties). 
Specifically, this possibility could be derived following, mutatis mutandi, the reasoning of 
De Sena regarding the responsibility of State members of the WB and the IMF for acts 
adopted by these financial institutions (De Sena 2010). 
Indeed, according to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, 
 
“[e]ach State Party to the […] Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”. 
 
According to De Sena, such a “progressive obligation” requires MS to use due 
diligence to ensure that financial institutions contribute to human rights in their financial 
assistance activities (De Sena 2010: 257). Within the WB and the IMF, this contribution 
could be made during the decision-making process, since the IMF Executive Board and 
WB Board of the Executive Directors, two bodies composed of representatives from MS, 
adopt their decisions according to an absolute majority rule. Therefore, 
 
“member States do not lack the possibility of acting to ensure that the conditionality 
clauses comply with the needs stemming from the ICESCR” (De Sena 2010: 259). And 
“it is precisely in the absence of any effort in this regard that they commit a violation of 
the general obligation envisaged by Article 2 of the Covenant” (De Sena 2010: 259). 
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The same reasoning could be applied within the ESM’s framework, for in this case also 
it is the members who represent States that then adopt its decisions. Specifically, these 
decisions are adopted by two bodies – the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors 
– composed of persons appointed by governments, who are revocable at any time.XLVII The 
Euro-area MS can, thus, steer ESM decisions on financial assistance and conditionality 
measures. 
However, although State responsibility could stem from the ICESCR, the guarantees 
enshrined therein are difficult to implement for two reasons. Firstly, to date many ESM 
States are not parties to the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,XLVIII which would allow 
individuals or other Members to submit a communication to the UN Committee for 
Human Rights. Secondly, there are challenges in demonstrating the causal link between the 
claimed violation and the State’s behavior within these financial institutions.XLIX 
Because of the link between the ESM’s decisions and the Euro-area MS, the latter’s 
responsibility could also be derived from the ECHR, and Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, 
which all the ESM MS have ratified, and on the basis of which an action could be brought 
by individuals before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
In light of this Protocol, conditionality measures could infringe the right to property 
enshrined in Article 1, as a consequence of cuts to public expenditures or where 
conditionality affects banks’ depositors, shareholders and bondholders. Moreover, a 
violation of Article 2 ECHR (namely a violation of the right to education), could arise as a 
consequence of cuts to public expenditures specifically where social expenditures in 
educational systems are concerned. 
However, within the ECHR framework, the guarantees enshrined in the ECHR and in 
the ECHR Protocol No. 1 seem difficult to implement because of the challenges in 
demonstrating the causal link between the claimed violation and the State’s behavior within 
these financial institutions. Thus, de facto, identifying the responsibility of ESM MS for 
financial measures that infringe their own human rights provisions is unrealistic. 
A finding of a possible violation of the ECHR by the State that adopts the economic 
adjustment measures in order to receive financial aid is also unrealistic, due to the wide 
margin of discretion that States enjoy in social and economic matters. The question 
regarding the compatibility of such national measures arose in Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece,L 
where the applicants claimed that cuts in public servants’ wages and pensions were 
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inconsistent with Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.LI The ECtHR, after having 
evaluated the Greek law that provided the basis for the reductions in question, affirmed 
that 
 
“[…] the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive. As it has already noted, 
the decision to enact laws to balance State expenditure and revenue will commonly 
involve consideration of political, economic and social issues, and the margin of 
appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies is 
a wide one”.LII 
 
According to the ECtHR, then, a fair balance was struck between the general interests 
of the [Greek] community and the requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the 
applicants.LIII 
One last consideration is whether there is some potential legal basis to invoke the 
responsibility of the ESM MS for the circumvention of obligations as State members of an 
international organization. Such a suggestion, as De Sena has already pointed out with 
regard to the IMF and the WB (De Sena 2010), finds some confirmation following Article 
61 of the 2011 Draft of Article on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(DARIO), according to which 
 
“[a] State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, 
by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the 
subject-matter of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that 
obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, 
would have constituted a breach of the obligation”.LIV 
 
However, as legal scholars have pointed out, in the 2011 version of DARIO Article 61, 
the International Law Commission “decided in favor of a subjective concept – other than 
in the preliminary version of DARIO Article 61 where an objective approach had been 
pursued” (Möldner 2011: 321, fn 153). Specifically, the Commentary regarding Article 61 
affirms that the term “circumvention” implies “the existence of an intention to avoid 
compliance” (Möldner 2011: 321), thus requiring a difficult burden of proof.LV 
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5. Final remarks 
 
This analysis has shown that the tools established to tackle Euro-area MS’ difficulties in 
fact give rise to human rights concerns because of the conditionality measures attached to 
economic adjustment programs. 
Furthermore, this analysis has illustrated the difficulty in invoking any responsibility for 
possible infringements of human rights provisions. 
Primarily, the ESM itself is not bound by human rights treaties, and the possibility to 
recall jus cogens seems not to be a viable option. 
Secondly, the ECJ has also denied any possible responsibility of EU institutions 
involved in such a financial mechanism because the ESM is set outside EU law. This is true 
of course. But, while EU institutions might be acting within the confines of the ESM, they 
should respect EU law, including the CFREU. Such a circumstance could be inferred by 
Article 13 TEU, and moreover has been highlighted by the Advocate General Kokott in 
her opinion regarding the Pringle case. The latter’s suggestion, expressed with regard to the 
Pringle case was, however, not even considered by the ECJ in the set of rulings regarding 
Cyprus, where the Court was expressly required to consider the possible responsibility of 
the ECB and the EC in light of potential fundamental rights breaches. 
Lastly, the responsibility of Eurozone Member States, which are parties to the ESM, 
although theoretically possible, is de facto unrealistic. 
Thus, in this realm, possible violations of human rights depending on conditionality 
measures are not likely to be remedied through the traditional legal channels. 
This scenario would probably change if the ESM was to be set within the EU legal 
system. Indeed, as it would then be a body of the EU, it would certainly have to act in 
cohesion with the full extent of EU Law, and thus with the CFREU. 
The possibility of linking the mechanisms to manage crisis situations (such as the ESM) 
to the EU system has been already considered by legal scholars (Schwarz 2014; see also 
Gallo 2015: 31); such a possibility, however, inevitably implies a new political will to reform 
the current legal framework governing financial aid within the Eurozone. 
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University of Padua (arianna.vettorel@unipd.it). 
I Art. 125 TFEU (ex 103 EC). 
II Art. 123 TFEU (ex 101 EC): ‘Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European 
Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central 
banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall 
be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central 
banks of debt instruments’. The clause is aimed at avoiding the risk of moral hazard. 
III O.J. 2010, L 118/1, “Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European 
financial stabilisation mechanism”. 
IV See COM(2010) 713, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Economic and 
Financial Committee on the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism”, Brussels, 30.11.2010. 
V The text of the EFSF statute and the other legal documents are available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
VI According to Art. 4 of the EFSF Consolidated Articles of Association ,(available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm, last visited 15 Dec. 2015) “[n]o new 
financing program and no new loan facility agreements will be established or entered after 30 June 2013”, 
even if the general meeting of shareholders could unanimously extend this date. The Irish financial assistance 
program concluded on 8 December 2013; the Portuguese one ended on 18 May 2014. The Greek program, 
instead, has been extended until 28 February 2015. Data available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
VII See the Preamble, point 2, of the EFSF Framework Agreement, available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf (last visited 15 Dec. 
2015). 
VIII See, in particular, Art. 40 (“Transfer of EFSF supports”) of the ESM Treaty (T/ESM 2012-LT). The text 
of the Treaty is available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm (last visited 15 
Dec. 2015). 
IX See the Preamble, point 6, of the ESM Treaty. During a transitional period, ended in June 2013, the EFSF 
and the ESM granted financial assistance in parallel, with a total lending capacity of 700 billion Euro.  
X O.J. 2011, L 91/1, “European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose 
currency is euro”, 2011/199/EU. 
XI According to the procedure established by Art. 48 TFEU, the Decision 2011/199 added a third paragraph 
to Art. 136 TFEU: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required 
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”. 
XII TSCG, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadAsset.aspx?id=27066 (last 
visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
XIII See http://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/index.htm (last visited 15 Dec. 2015).  
XIV In particular, the Governor shall be an individual from an ESM Member’s Government who has 
responsibility for financial decisions within his or her Member State. Every ESM Member shall appoint an 
alternate Governor. See Art. 5 of the ESM Treaty. 
XV The membership of the Board of Directors is explained by Art. 6 ESM Treaty, which, after providing that 
“[e]ach Governor shall appoint one Director and one alternate Director from among people of high 
competence in economic and financial matters”, affirms that “[s]uch appointments shall be revocable at any 
time”.  
XVI Art. 13(1) ESM Treaty. 
XVII Art. 13(3), ESM Treaty. 
XVIII Art. 13(4), ESM Treaty. 
XIX Art. 13(5), ESM Treaty. 
XX ECJ, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Governement of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, nyr in ECR. 
XXI The Decision No. 2011/199 was adopted on the basis of Art. 48 TFEU, which concerns the simplified 
revision process. However, since this process can be used only with regard to Part Three of the TFEU and 
cannot increase the competences of the EU, the referring court asked whether such conditions were met by 
this Decision. Specifically, with regard to the first condition, namely whether the Decision dealt with only 
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Part Three of the TFEU, the referring court highlighted the potential impact of the establishment of a 
permanent stability mechanism on the common monetary policy, enshrined in the Part One of the TFEU 
and on which the EU has an exclusive competence. Since the TFEU does not provide any specific definition 
of monetary policy, the ECJ gave its interpretation in light of the different objectives pursued by the common 
monetary policy and the ESM. While the former is aimed at maintaining price stability, the latter is aimed at 
safeguarding the stability of the Euro area as a whole. Thus, according to the ECJ, “[e]ven though the stability 
of the euro area may have repercussions on the stability of the currency used within that area, an economic 
policy measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may 
have indirect effects on the stability of the euro” (Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 56). For this reason, according 
to the ECJ, the ESM does not concern Part One of the Treaty. With regard to the second condition, namely 
whether this Decision would have increased the competences of the EU, the ECJ affirmed that the 
amendment of Art. 136 TFEU did not create any legal basis for the EU to be able to take any action that was 
not also possible prior to the amendment. Specifically, according to the ECJ, “[e]ven though the ESM Treaty 
makes use of the Union’s institutions, in particular the Commission and the ECB, that fact is not, in any 
event, capable of affecting the validity of Decision 2011/199, which in itself provides only for the 
establishment of a stability mechanism by the Member States and is silent on any possible role for the 
Union’s institutions in that connection” (Case C-370/12, Pringle, cit., para 74). Thus, Decision 2011/199 did 
not increase the competences conferred on the EU in the Treaties. 
XXII The Court also stated that Member States are allowed to enter into an international agreement between 
themselves, provided that the commitments undertaken by the Member States who are party to such an 
agreement are consistent with EU law. Specifically, the ECJ affirmed that the ESM does not prevent the 
Council of the European Union to decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon measures 
appropriate to the economic situation, according to Article 122 TFEU. See Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 109. 
XXIII Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 139. 
XXIV Ivi, para 111. 
XXV Ibidem. 
XXVI See European Commission, “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. First Review – 
December 2012”, Occasional Papers 123/December 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp123_en.pdf (last 
visited 15 Dec. 2015) at 205, 209, 210-211. 
XXVII Report of the independent expert on the effects of the foreign debt and other related international 
financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and 
cultural rights, at http://www.ohchr.org (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
XXVIII UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other 
related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly 
economic, social and cultural rights, Cephas Lumina, Mission to Greece (22 – 27 April 2013), 27 March 2014, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
XXIX Ivi, at 12. 
XXX According to the report, “unemployment grew from 7.3 per cent in June 2008 to 27.9 per cent in June 
2013, the highest in the European Union”. Moreover, “[y]outh unemployment reached an unprecedented rate 
of 64.9 per cent in May 2013 (compared with an average of 24.4 in the euro zone)”, ivi at 13.  
XXXI The report also registered that “[o]wing to the rise in long-term unemployment, only a fraction of all 
registered unemployed persons receive benefits (27 per cent as at February 2013). Moreover, unemployment 
benefits expire after 12 months, resulting in the loss of public health insurance cover. Many young people are 
not eligible for support because they have never had a job and have not paid the required national insurance 
contributions. […] These wholesale pension cuts have pushed a large proportion of the population into 
poverty. […] The Independent Expert shares the view of the European Committee of Social Rights that the 
‘cumulative effect’ of the various laws introduced as ‘austerity measures’ in Greece since May 2010, restricting 
and reducing both public and private pension benefits, constituted a violation of the right to social security 
enshrined in article 12(3) of the European Social Charter”. Ivi, at 15-16. 
XXXII According to the report, such illness has resurfaced owing to the discontinuation of anti-mosquito 
spraying programmes. Ivi, at 17. 
XXXIII Ibidem. 
XXXIV Ivi, at 19. 
XXXV Ivi, at 20. 
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XXXVI The International Expert reported that “[i]n May 2013, the Government invoked national emergency 
legislation allowing it to compel public sector employees to work to ban a planned strike by the National 
Union for High School Teachers against austerity measures during university entrance examinations. […] 
There has also been a rise in hate crimes and xenophobia against the country’s immigrant community, largely 
targeted in an attempt to find a scapegoat for the crisis. […] In April 2013, the National Commission for 
Human Rights (UNHCR) and a coalition of 30 non-governmental organizations documented 154 incidents 
of racist violence in 2012 alone, of which 151 committed against refugees and migrants and three against 
European citizens. It is believed that most attacks were committed by members of extremist groups, and that 
only a fraction of all cases are actually documented. […] Lastly, the enjoyment of human rights has been 
further undermined by the limited ability of public accountability bodies, such as the Greek Ombudsman and 
the National Commission for Human Rights, to respond adequately to human rights issues in the context of 
the economic crisis owing to insufficient funding for operations. Other barriers to access to justice include 
lengthy proceedings before civil and administrative courts, higher fees for initiating legal proceedings and 
inadequate funding for legal aid”. Ivi, at 21-22. 
XXXVII On this topic, see infra paras 4.2. and 4.3. 
XXXVIII Art. 13(3) ESM Treaty. 
XXXIX Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 178-180. 
XL Art. 37(2) ESM Treaty. 
XLI Art. 37(3) ESM Treaty. 
XLII Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 180. 
XLIII View of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-370/12, Pringle, nyr in ECR, para 176. 
XLIV GC, Case T-289/13, Lerda Advertising v. Commission and ECB, nyr in ECR; GC, Case T-290/13, CMBG v. 
Commission and ECB, nyr in ECR; Case T-291/13, Eleftheriou and Papachristofi v. Commission and ECB, nyr in 
ECR; Case T-292/13, Evangelou v. Commission and ECB, nyr in ECR; Case T-293/13, Theophilou v. Commission 
and ECB, nyr in ECR; Case T-294/13, Fialtor v. Commission and ECB,nyr in ECR. All orders were issued on 10 
November 2014. 
XLV Specifically, uninsured deposits were converted into BoC shares (37.5% of each uninsured deposit), into 
instruments that were convertible by BoC either into shares or into deposits (22.5% of each uninsured 
deposit), and into instruments which were convertible into deposits by Central Bank of Cyprus (40% of each 
uninsured deposit). Additionally, certain assets and liabilities were transferred from Laïki to BoC, including 
deposits of up to Euro 100,000. Deposits over Euro 100,000 remained with Laïki, pending its liquidation. See 
GC, Case T-289/13, Lerda Advetising, para 17-18; Case T-290/13, CMBG, para 17-18; Case T-291/13, 
Eleftheriou, para 17-18; Case T-292/13, Evangelou, para 17-18; Case T-293/13, Theophilou, para 17-18; Case T-
294/13, Fialtor, para 17-18. 
XLVI Only within the EFSF did the Eurogroup Working Group play a role in granting financial assistance. See 
Art. 2, EFSF Framework Agreement. 
XLVIIArt. 5(1) and Art. 6(1) ESM Treaty. 
XLVIII Data available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
XLIX It is precisely for that reason that De Sena highlighted the role played by inter-State communications “to 
bring to the fore violations raising issue of ‘general importance’, since such communications are not required 
to show – in order to be received by the Committee – that a ‘clear disadvantage’ has been suffered as a 
consequence of the alleged violation” (De Sena 2010: 261). 
L ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy, 7 May 2013, App. No 57665/12 and 57657/12, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited 15 Dec. 2015). 
LI The first applicant was a member of the Athens Bar, who worked as a member of the scientific staff of the 
Greek Ombudsman’s Office and was later seconded to the central department of the Technical Chamber of 
Greece, a corporate body governed by public law. Thus, her pay was governed by laws on the salary rules 
applicable to public servants and public-sector employees. The second applicant was a trade union 
organisation representing several unions of public-sector workers employed on a permanent basis or under 
private law by the State, corporations governed by public law and the local and regional authorities. During 
2010, the Greece Government adopted a law that reduced the pay of persons working in the public sector – 
irrespective of their employment status – by a percentage ranging from 12% to 30%, notwithstanding any 
other specific or general legislation, collective agreement, arbitration ruling or individual agreement or 
contract. Ivi, paras 3 and 4. 
LII Ivi, para 39. 
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LIII The Court considers that “the extent of the reduction in the first applicant’s salary was not such as to 
place her at risk of having insufficient means to live on and thus to constitute a breach of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1. In view of the foregoing and of the particular context of crisis in which the interference in 
question occurred, the latter could not be said to have imposed an excessive burden on the applicant”. Ivi, 
para 46. Moreover, as to the proportionality of the impugned measures with regard to the wages and 
pensions of the public servants affiliated to the second applicant, the Court referred to the text of the 
memorandum of understanding itself and affirmed that “[a]ccording to the memorandum, the abolition of 
the thirteenth and fourteenth pension payments was compensated for, in the case of persons receiving less 
than EUR 2,500 per month, by the introduction of a flat-rate bonus of EUR 800 per year. Furthermore, 
while the thirteenth and fourteenth salary payments were abolished across the board, an annual bonus of 
EUR 1,000 was introduced, funded by the reduction in the allowances previously payable to higher earners. 
This bonus was introduced with the aim of protecting those in the lowest income segments (persons 
receiving less than EUR 3,000 per month)”. Ivi, para 47. 
LIV Art. 61 of DARIO. 
LV On the conditions for international responsibility to arise, see the Commentary to Art. 61 DARIO. 
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